



НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ
УНИВЕРСИТЕТ

Epistemic Taxonomy of Assertions

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Plan

- ▶ Types of Assertions and Some Theoretical Difficulties
- ▶ Elements of Epistemic/Doxastic Logic
- ▶ Strong Common Belief
- ▶ An Epistemic Taxonomy of Assertions

TYPES OF ASSERTIONS

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2. A: 'I'm not an A'
3. 'Boys are boys'
4. ' $2 = 2$ '
5. 'You are the cream in my coffee'
6. 'Sky is blue'

Theoretical Difficulties

Maxim of Quality:

Do not say what you believe to be false.

Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

- ▶ Flouting of the Maxim of Quality
- ▶ irony, metaphor, etc
- ▶ deception vs. irony

Maxim of Quantity

Maxim of Quantity: Be as informative as required.

- ▶ 'Boys are Boys'
- ▶ 'A is A'

Epistemic Presuppositions

S : φ to H at c .

Epistemic presuppositions describe S 's and H 's higher-order epistemic and doxastic attitudes (φ, c) .

Meta-knowledge and implicature

know vs. think

«...the speaker thinks and (would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks)...» [Grice 1989, p.31]

«...he (and knows that I know that he knows...)» [Grice 1989, p.31]

Types of Presuppositions

Semantic presupposition:

should be associated with specific triggers ('stop', 'continue', 'regret', ...)

Pragmatic presupposition:

«A speaker presupposes that P at a given moment in a conversation just in case he is disposed to act, in his linguistic behavior, as if he takes the truth of P for granted, and as if he assumes that his audience recognizes that he is doing so».

[Stalnaker 1975, p.32]

ELEMENTS OF EPISTEMIC/DOXATIC LOGIC

The syntax of language \mathcal{L}_E is given by the following formula

$$\varphi := p \mid \varphi \wedge \psi \mid \varphi \vee \psi \mid \varphi \rightarrow \psi \mid \neg \varphi \mid B_i \varphi \mid K_i \varphi$$

$K_i \varphi$ - 'an agent i knows that φ '

$B_i \varphi$ - 'an agent i believes that φ '

An epistemic/doxastic model

$\mathcal{M} = \langle \mathcal{A}, W, \{\sim_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{A}}, \{\preceq_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{A}}, V \rangle$, where

- \mathcal{A} – set of agents

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- ▶ $V : Var\mathcal{L}_E \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)$

Properties of \sim_i

► $K_i\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$

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Properties

- ▶ $K_i\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ (Factivity)
- ▶ $K_i\varphi \rightarrow K_iK_i\varphi$ (Positive Introspection)
- ▶ $\neg K_i\varphi \rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\varphi$ (Negative Introspection)
- ▶ $B_i\varphi \rightarrow B_iB_i\varphi$ (Positive Introspection)
- ▶ $\neg B_i\varphi \rightarrow B_i\neg B_i\varphi$ (Negative Introspection)


Truth in a Model

φ is true at state w in a model \mathcal{M} is defined by induction

- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, w \models p$ iff $w \in V(p)$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, w \models \neg\varphi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, w \not\models \varphi$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi \wedge \psi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi$ and $\mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi \vee \psi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi$ or $\mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, w \not\models \varphi$ or $\mathcal{M}, w \models \psi$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, w \models K_i\varphi$ iff $\forall w'(w \sim_i w' \rightarrow \mathcal{M}, w' \models \varphi)$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, w \models B_i\varphi$ iff $\forall w'(w' \in \max_{\preceq_i}([w]_i) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}, w' \models \varphi)$
- ▶ $\max_{\preceq_i}(X) := \{w \in X \mid \forall w' \in X : w' \preceq_i w\}$, where $X \subseteq W$
- ▶ $[w]_i := \{w' \in W \mid w \sim_i w'\}$



a knows p

$$\mathcal{M}_1, w_1 \models K_a p$$




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

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
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
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$$\mathcal{M}_2, w_1 \models \neg K_a p$$



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
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

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
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


Pragmatics of question

a asks *b*: *p*?



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a asks b : p ?




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
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

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

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
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



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






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



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



















































► $[\varphi]_{\mathcal{M}} \Leftrightarrow \{w \in W \mid \mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi\}$


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- ▶ $\max_{\preceq_i}(X) \Leftrightarrow \{w \in X \mid \forall w' \in X : w' \preceq_i w\}$, где $X \subseteq W$


$$[\varphi]_{\mathcal{M}} \Leftrightarrow \{w \in W \mid \mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi\}$$




$[\varphi]_{\mathcal{M}} \Leftrightarrow \{w \in W \mid \mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi\}, [\textcolor{red}{p}]_{\mathcal{M}} = ?$




$$[\varphi]_{\mathcal{M}} \Leftrightarrow \{w \in W \mid \mathcal{M}, w \models \varphi\}, [p]_{\mathcal{M}} = \{w_1, w_2, w_4, w_5, w_6\}$$




$$[w]_i \Leftrightarrow \{w' \in W \mid w \sim_i w'\}$$




$[w]_i \Leftrightarrow \{w' \in W \mid w \sim_i w'\}, [w_1]_i = ?$



$$[w]_i \Leftrightarrow \{w' \in W \mid w \sim_i w'\}, [w_1]_i = \{w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4, w_5\}$$




$\max_{\preceq_i}(X) \Leftrightarrow \{w \in X \mid \forall w' \in X : w' \preceq_i w\}$, где $X \subseteq W$




$\max_{\preceq_i}(X) \Leftrightarrow \{w \in X \mid \forall w' \in X : w' \preceq_i w\}$, где $X \subseteq W$,

$\max_{\preceq_i}(\{w_1, w_2, w_3\}) = ?$




$\max_{\preceq_i}(X) \Leftrightarrow \{w \in X \mid \forall w' \in X : w' \preceq_i w\}$, где $X \subseteq W$,

$\max_{\preceq_i}(\{w_1, w_2, w_3\}) = \{w_3\}$




$\max_{\preceq_i}(X) \Leftrightarrow \{w \in X \mid \forall w' \in X : w' \preceq_i w\}$, где $X \subseteq W$,

$\max_{\preceq_i}([w_2]_i) = ?$




$\max_{\preceq_i}(X) \Leftrightarrow \{w \in X \mid \forall w' \in X : w' \preceq_i w\}$, где $X \subseteq W$,


$\max_{\preceq_i}([w_2]_i) = \{w_4, w_5\}$





$\mathcal{M}, w_1 \models B_i p$


$\mathcal{M}, w_6 \not\models B_i p$









$$\underline{w_1} : p$$



$$w_2 : \bar{p}$$














$$\underline{w_1} : p, q$$



$$w_2 : p, \bar{q}$$



$$\underline{w_1} : p, q$$


$$w_2 : p, \bar{q}$$



$$w_3 : \bar{p}, q$$



$$\underline{w_1} : p, q$$



$$w_2 : p, \bar{q}$$



$$w_3 : \bar{p}, q$$



$$w_4 : \bar{p}, \bar{q}$$























STRONG COMMON BELIEF

Group Knowledge and Belief

$$\varphi := K_G\varphi \mid B_G\varphi \mid C_G\varphi \mid CB_G\varphi \mid CB_G^*\varphi$$

Everybody knows...

$$K_G\varphi := \bigwedge_{i \in G} K_i\varphi$$

Everybody knows (n degree)

$$K_G^n := \underbrace{K_G \dots K_G}_n$$

Common Knowledge

$$C_G\varphi := \bigwedge_{n=1}^{\infty} K_G^n\varphi = K_G\varphi \wedge K_G^2\varphi \wedge K_G^3\varphi \wedge \dots$$

Properties of Common knowledge

- ▶ $\models C_G \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$
- ▶ $\models C_G \varphi \rightarrow C_G C_G \varphi$
- ▶ $\models \neg C_G \varphi \rightarrow C_G \neg C_G \varphi$

Everybody Believes...

$$\blacktriangleright B_G\varphi := \bigwedge_{i \in G} B_i\varphi$$

Everybody believes (n degree)

$$\blacktriangleright B_G^n := \underbrace{B_G \dots B_G}_n$$

Common Belief

$$CB_G\varphi := \bigwedge_{n=1}^{\infty} B_G^n\varphi = B_G\varphi \wedge B_G^2\varphi \wedge B_G^3\varphi \wedge \dots$$

Strong Common Belief

$$CB_G^* \varphi := C_G(B_G \varphi) = \bigwedge_{n=1}^{\infty} K_G^n(B_G \varphi)$$

Properties

1. $\models C_G\varphi \rightarrow C_B^*\varphi$
2. $\models C_G\varphi \rightarrow CB_G^*\varphi$
3. $\not\models C_B^*\varphi \rightarrow C_G\varphi$
4. $\models CB_G^*\varphi \rightarrow CB_G\varphi$
5. $\not\models CB_G\varphi \rightarrow CB_G^*\varphi$
6. $\not\models CB_G^*\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$
7. $\models CB_G^*\varphi \rightarrow CB_G^*CB_G^*\varphi$
8. $\models \neg CB_G^*\varphi \rightarrow CB_G^*\neg CB_G^*\varphi$

Property	Axiom	$C_G\varphi$	$CB_G\varphi$	$CB_G^*\varphi$
Factivity	$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$	✓	×	×
Positive Introspection	$\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi$	✓	✓	✓
Negative Introspection	$\neg\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\neg\Box\varphi$	✓	×	✓

Table: Properties of epistemic/doxastic operators

TAXONOMY OF ASSERTIONS

Literal assertion vs. Non-literal assertion

$S : \varphi$ in the context c

1. Non-literal assertion: $CB_{S,H}^* \neg \varphi$
2. Literal assertion: $\neg CB_{S,H}^* \neg \varphi$

1. Non-literal assertion

1. Non-literal assertion: $CB_{S,H}^* \neg \varphi$

► 1.1. Conventional (non-literal) assertion

$\exists \psi : CB_{S,H}^*(\varphi \rightsquigarrow \psi)$

irony, metaphor, hyperbole etc.

► 1.2. Nonconventional (non-literal) assertion

$\neg \exists \psi : CB_{S,H}^*(\varphi \rightsquigarrow \psi)$

2. Literal assertion

2. Literal assertion: $\neg CB_{S,H}^* \neg \varphi$

► 2.1. Trivial assertion

$$CB_{S,H}^* \varphi$$

► 2.2. Non-trivial assertion

$$\neg CB_{S,H}^* \varphi$$

2. Literal > 2.1. Trivial assertion

2.1. Trivial assertion: $CB_{S,H}^*\varphi$

- ▶ 2.1.1. Conventional (trivial literal) assertion

$$\exists\psi : CB_{S,H}^*(\varphi \rightsquigarrow \psi)$$

- ▶ 2.1.2. Non-conventional (trivial literal) assertion

$$\neg\exists\psi : CB_{S,H}^*(\varphi \rightsquigarrow \psi)$$

2. Literal > 2.2. Non-trivial assertion

2.2. Non-trivial assertion: $\neg CB_{S,H}^* \varphi$

- ▶ 2.2.1. Deceptive assertion

$$B_S \neg \varphi$$

- ▶ 2.2.2. Non-deceptive assertion

$$\neg B_S \neg \varphi$$

2. Literal > 2.2. Non-trivial > 2.2.2. Non-deceptive

2.2.2. Non-deceptive assertion: $\neg B_S \neg \varphi$

- ▶ 2.2.2.1. Truthful assertion

$$B_S \varphi$$

- ▶ 2.2.2.2. Bluffing assertion

$$\neg B_S \varphi$$

Epistemic Taxonomy of Assertions

