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"Chalmers' weak modal rationalism: pro et contra"

My first aim is to show that Chalmers’ weak modal rationalism (thesis that ideal positive primary conceivability entails primary possibility) is one of the most important anti-physicalist tools in contemporary philosophy of mind, and there is a long-standing debate whether the argument is valid and sound. My second aim is to present objections to Chalmers' theory and assess it successively. I will present three objections: first of all, an argument that I attribute to Peter Kung (2008) who claims that we are able to conceive the impossible. Secondly, I will present a related argument which I attribute to Berglund (2005) who attacks Chalmers' idealization and argues that it renders the epistemology useless to us limited conceivers. Finally, I will present Keith Frankish’s “anti-zombie argument” (2007), which is intended to be an improved version of the parody of the zombie argument.