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**The “hard problem of consciousness’ and its back translation: the aspects of continental philosophy, cognitive sciences and neurosciences**

1. We argue that the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ (HPC) is a problem of ‘translation’ for Philosophy. It is a problem of rendering mental states in the terms of neuroscientific description of cerebration. To deal with the HPC, it is necessary to define the object, methods and those principles and criteria which allow to assess a ‘translation’ as adequate.

2. Partially, the HPC in the sphere of Philosophy is caused by the fact that a philosopher does not have access to the procedures and results of the initial translation, by which data, procedures and records complied by neurophysiologists are meant. In practice, a philosopher has to deal with a ‘back translation’ provided by cognitive scientists. One can see the results of such a ‘back translation’ in the works by Thomas Metzinger, Joseph LeDoux and Antonio Damasio. In their works the translation is subjected to a back translation in the terms similar to those used in continental philosophy.

3. A number of problems connected with the object of translation arise. A. Demasiado, J. E. LeDoux, Th. Metzinger (referred to as negative cognitive scientists because they have chosen the method of the HPC description dealing with mental disfunctions, wounds and diseases) are aware of the fact that the concept of consciousness has a nominalistic and historical nature; whereas, the results they describe are of some ‘naïve’ realistic nature. In other words, for these philosophers the genuine object of their studies and ‘translation’ is not some real consciousness experiences, but a number of specific philosophical concepts.

4. The results of such a back translation cannot be regarded as adequate because the object of the translation is substituted. The back translation distorts the concept of consciousness. It is evident in the works by Th. Metzinger, who summed up the results of back translation in the thesis ‘*Consciousness is the appearance of the world*’. This thesis contradicts the nominalistic and historical nature of the concept ‘consciousness’ in the terms of the Modern Time philosophy. If we interpret the ‘consciousness” in a nominalistic way, it cannot be an ‘appearance’. If we adhere to its interpretation as an ‘appearance’, we do not mean the consciousness any more.

5. Philosophy should be more careful about the results, procedures and tools of the HPC as a translation method because at this stage it is Philosophy, not neurosciences or cognitive sciences, has the system of methods developed enough to assess and analyze the HPC.