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**Epistemological constructivism versus object-oriented philosophy: a false dilemma. On the position of speculative realism in contemporary intellectual history.**

Speculative realism or more generally realistic point in contemporary philosophy has become a considerable event in intellectual life of recent years. The crucial point of self-determination of neo-realists is the denial of the common place in 20th century’s philosophy, which is that discourse on a subject cannot be separated from discourse on how subject is presented to consciousness. We’re going to criticize this way of positioning and to deliberately erode the boundary which separates new realists from the early intellectual context.

Our initial thesis is that object-oriented philosophical trend is totally included in a broader intellectual tendency of 20th century, tendency of exceptional philosophical interest to the Other. This tendency has paved its way through the history of different research initiatives. The most significant example of its development is the history of phenomenological movement. Levinas is the key-person here as we argue that there is inextricable link between ethical and onto-epistemological aspects of this problem. Intellectual endeavour of depriving the Subject of its capacity of reduction coincides with the point of «shame» of Western man for his hubris and arrogance that has been ended in excesses of Nazi politics. Interest in otherness, difference, multiplicity and the irreducible is principal trait of all humanitarian researches “after Auschwitz”. But it is the same impact that determines the context of object-oriented philosophy.

Moreover – and this is our second thesis – being treated in this way object-oriented philosophy doesn’t confronts but is mutually supported by theoretical studies gathered by speculative realists under the title of “correlationism”. According to Gram Harman’s critic Peter Wolfendale new realism is based on two main pre-theoretical intuitions – “ontological humility ” and “epistemic humility ”. However “correlationism” itself starts from the very same point (under the name of epistemological constructivism).

In this regard our third thesis is that hard confrontation between so-called constructivism and so-called realism is the point of a pseudo-problem. This problem can be overcome with the help of distinction of two distinctions: speculative, “qualitative” distinction between “as it is” and “for us”, which provides the basis for neo-realistic scholastic arguments, on the one hand; and pragmatic, “quantitative” distinction between degrees of “openness” (in Popper’s terms) – on the other.

Distinct tendency of regression of the former distinction to the context of the latter that is inherent to neo-realistic discourses themselves gives us another argument for our thesis that insistence on the uniqueness of neo-realistic position exposes itself as unnecessary, redundant gesture in the background of its intellectual context that is fully determined by the pragmatic turn to the irreducible Other.